Uranium Weapons Cover-ups- a Crime against Humankind
By Piotr Bein, Ph.D., M.A.Sc., P.Eng.,
Karen Parker, J.D., Diplome (
Paper prepared in January 2003, for a monograph Politics and
Environmental Policy in the 21st Century, Faculty of Political Sciences,
Abstract:
Munitions that contain low-grade
uranium 235 - insufficient to trigger nuclear explosion - are
chemical-radiological weapons. They contain other toxic-radioactive elements
and have indiscriminate effects. They are illegal by virtue of international
conventions, laws and customs of war. When used in populated areas or in the
presence of numerous troops (enemy or friendly), they become weapons of delayed
but mass destruction (WMD). Fatal consequences of depleted uranium (DU) armour-piercing ammunition emerged in veterans and
civilians after wars in the
While the victims remain neglected, hundreds of tons of uranium from
weapons developed in recent years against hard and buried targets have polluted
The media act as a propaganda outlet for these groups. The purpose of Information Operations behind the propaganda is to influence perceptions and actions of foreign and domestic public, governments, and intelligence. A spiraling group self-deception perpetuates the propaganda for fear of liability and criminal responsibility. Covering up information on war crimes and crimes against humanity, and military and foreign policy based on such information, are crimes themselves. Independent researchers urge priority actions to reverse the cycle of deception and human suffering because of deception on uranium weapons: (i) weapon inspections to determine which ones contain uranium, (ii) target inspection to identify those hit and contaminated by uranium weapons, (iii) health monitoring and support for target communities in uranium-contaminated areas, and (v) fundamental review of all research that was so far restricted to DU instead of uranium weaponry in general.
The weapons clearly violate humanitarian law, even in the absence of a
specific treaty barring their use. The violations related to the use of the
weapons are sufficiently grave to be classified war crimes or crimes against
humanity, which would impose legal liability and criminal sanctions on the
users as well as fair compensation and other remedies for the victims of these
weapons. A treaty banning uranium weaponry is not necessary, but preparations
for one could be exploited to duck responsibility. Even beginning the process
to draft a treaty could be used by the
Conclusion: Pro-uranium weapons propaganda operates within the cover-up system of the nuclear complex. At its core is a basically flawed model of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, according to which low-level internal radiation from fine uranium particles is not a hazard. Proponents of uranium power and weapons use the model instead of empirical evidence, which they suppress with a sophisticated misinformation and fact-distortion web reaching as far as international organizations responsible for public health. Recognizing the harm done, Williams, for example, urges priority actions to reverse the cycle of deception and human suffering because of uranium weaponry: (i) weapon inspections to determine which ones contain uranium, (ii) target inspection to identify those hit and contaminated by uranium weapons, (iii) health monitoring and support for target communities in uranium-contaminated areas, and (v) fundamental review of all research that was so far restricted to DU instead of uranium weaponry in general.
Observers believe that DU cover-ups serve to ease public acceptability of present non-nuclear uranium weapons against hard targets, present small nuclear warheads, and future pure fusion nuclear weapons. All of these weapons contaminate with low level radiation. A future combat scenario using fusion micro-weapons translates into a low-level radioactive input comparable to that on DU battlefields [Gsponer et al., 2002]. Elimination of uranium radiological and fission weapons in the 21st century would not terminate the health and environmental problems of low-level radiation battles. Unless the legal thresholds of acceptability of so-called low-level radiation are removed, the perpetrators of non-nuclear but still radiological uranium weapons would continue to contravene humanitarian law and place increasing parts of the planet at risk. Ultimately, massive long-term human catastrophe might result, far beyond the borders of radioactive wars. Thus, the authors see the only solution is a complete and universal termination of the development, testing, production and use of these weapons of indiscriminate effect and delayed mass destruction. A beginning of that termination is H. R. 3155, introduced at the US Congress.
Dr. Piotr Bein holds a master's degree from the Technical University of
Denmark and a doctorate in applied decision and risk analysis from the
Dr. Karen Parker received a Juris Doctor degree
(honors) from the University of San Francisco School of
Law and a Diplome (cum laude) from the International
Institute of Human Rights (
Copyright Piotr Bein and Karen Parker, 2003. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to post this text on non-commercial community internet sites, provided the source and the URL are indicated, the paper remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To publish this text in printed and/or other forms, including commercial internet sites and excerpts, contact Piotr Bein at piotr.bein@imag.net and Karen Parker at ied@igc.org
FULL PAPER
(They are no more All powerful. As their secrets
Are unfolded. -- Afon Claerwen,
Munitions that contain low-grade
uranium 235 - insufficient to trigger nuclear explosion - are
chemical-radiological weapons. They contain other toxic-radioactive elements
and have indiscriminate effects. They are illegal by virtue of international
conventions, laws and customs of war. When used in populated areas or in the
presence of numerous troops (enemy or friendly), they become weapons of delayed
but mass destruction (WMD). Fatal consequences of depleted uranium (DU) armour-piercing ammunition emerged in veterans and
civilians after wars in the
Up-coming war scenarios involve larger chemical-radiological contamination potential. The military, governments, and nuclear and weapon industries fail to or inadequately disclose the effects of uranium weapons, and manipulate inquiries of international health organizations. The media act as a propaganda outlet for these groups. The purpose of Information Operations behind the propaganda is to influence perceptions and actions of foreign and domestic public, governments, and intelligence. A spiraling group self-deception perpetuates the propaganda for fear of liability and criminal responsibility.
Covering up information on war crimes and crimes against humanity, and military and foreign policy based on such information, are crimes themselves. Independent researchers urge priority actions to reverse the cycle of deception and human suffering ecause of deception on uranium weapons: (i) weapon inspections to determine which ones contain uranium, (ii) target inspection to identify those hit and contaminated by uranium weapons, (iii) health monitoring and support for target communities in uranium-contaminated areas, and (v) fundamental review of all research that was so far restricted to DU instead of uranium weaponry in general.
The weapons clearly violate humanitarian law, even in the absence of a
specific treaty barring their use. The violations related to the use of the
weapons are sufficiently grave to be classified war crimes or crimes against
humanity, which would impose legal liability and criminal sanctions on the
users as well as fair compensation and other remedies for the victims of these
weapons. A treaty banning uranium weaponry is not necessary, but preparations
for one could be exploited to duck responsibility. Even beginning the process
to draft a treaty could be used by the
Unsuspecting activists play into
the
Introduction: The concept of toxic-radioactive warfare dates back to
World War II when air attacks with uranium oxide aerosols were considered a
realistic threat. Since then, the
Leading scientists in the area of radiation and its consequences have joined with an increasing number of victims of DU weaponry (including former combatants and civilians), and have squared off against the governments that have developed and used, or sanctioned the use of, these weapons. The "Kosovo" DU scandal in 2000/2001 saw tools of information warfare employed to cover-up use of uranium non-atomic weapons, including intimidation of vocal victims of DU, independent researchers, and activists in the West and former Soviet block countries. A consequential information warfare and the politics regarding DU is tracked by the growing number of concerned groups, including, for example, DU-Watch (www.du-watch.org). Contributed to by many individuals, this material precipitated propaganda analyses presented to international conferences in Manchester in November 2000 [Bein] and in Prague a year later [Bein and Zori*]. A recent article describes information warfare in the context of war propaganda constructed around the "Osama-WMD" theme [Chossudovsky, 2003].
The findings of research into the effects or DU and other weaponry containing radiation but not causing nuclear explosions (which as a whole can be referred to as radiological weaponry) are indisputable. Even a cursory review of existing norms of the laws and customs of war (humanitarian law) supports the conclusion that uranium weaponry of any type is so patently illegal that the discussion should really focus on bringing to justice those who have used it and redirecting action towards the victims of these weapons.
But the international community still confronts the "denial and deflect" policies of the users. Why this quest to cover-up uranium weapons and misrepresent their health and environmental effects? The paper seeks to answer the question step-by-step. Part 1 briefly sets out the science of radiological weapons, and summarizes their hazards. It then sets out a digest of official documents proving that the authorities responsible for uranium contamination knew about the risks involved - the principal reason they suppressed the evidence. Part 2 overviews humanitarian law relating to weaponry and the consequences of violations, including the duty to condemn such weaponry, the duty to compensate victims (redress), and the duty to clean up. Understanding of this clearly shows why those responsible think they have to cover-up that they knowingly developed and used "illegal" weapons. Rather than face those consequences, they misstate, mislead, and misinform. Part 3 analyses the details of the cover-ups with a view on exposing the methods and tactics and providing a way to counter the damage caused by the cover-ups.
Part 1: Uranium weapons and their
hazards
Uranium
properties and military non-nuclear applications
Counting only uranium isotopes, uranium ore contains 99.3% U-238, 0.7% U-235 and traces of U-234. DU metal is depleted of U-235 down to about 0.2%, hence the name. The rest is U-238 and traces of U-234. The combined radioactivity of DU is about 40% less than in the natural mix of uranium isotopes. References on DU weapons describe physical properties of the metal as if other metallic forms of uranium differed. This is true for uranium alloyed with other metals that can significantly alter the original properties, but not for the uranium isotopes. For example, a mix of 99.3% U-238, 0.7% U-235 and trace quantity of U-234 would have the same physical properties as DU, but would be difficult to detect, since the ratio of uranium isotopes, the prime detection parameter for DU, would be similar to that in nature.
At 19.1 g/cm3, uranium has an advantage over slightly denser tungsten,
which is not as abundant and very expensive. The nuclear industry has hundreds
of thousands tons of waste DU to dispose of after U-235 has been extracted. For
the
The applications of armour-piercers range from 20 mm Phalanx gun in the navy for piercing attacking missiles, through 30 mm gun in A-10 aircraft, to 105 mm and larger tank barrels. Tank armour and removable armour of combat vehicles are hardened with DU plate. Many countries, industrialized and poor, make and use the DU bullets and armour. Significantly more uranium than in DU bullets would be used in weapons developed under a Hard or Deeply Buried Target Defeat Capability (HDBTDC) programme launched by the US military in the mid 1990s [www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/hdbtdc.htm]. The weapons must be able to penetrate targets in hardened buildings, or underground. This can be accomplished with a high density penetrating warheads with smart fuses that delay detonation until the weapon is in the desired space, for example, on the lowest level of a multi-level concrete building. The weapons also need to neutralize chemical and biological agents before they escape into the environment, by using incendiary warheads.
Owing to its density, uranium - depleted or not - can double the penetration power relative to older weapons. Currently, over 20 weapon systems against hard and buried targets, stocked for imminent "wars on terror", are most likely made of uranium. New versions are under development and testing. The biggest of them, Big BLU, contains several tons of a "dense metal" in the penetrator alone. The mysterious metal must be uranium, since as dense and harder tungsten would be prohibitively expensive, less workable and not readily ignitable. Dr. Asaf Durakovic measured very significantly higher levels of uranium in Afghanis near targets hit by penetrating bombs and missiles. His team noticed the weapons punched through several concrete floors and walls, then buried 3 to 4 meters in the earth before exploding. [www.umrc.net].
Were they used in foreseeable war scenarios, the weapons would produce contamination levels significantly higher than from DU bullets in the Gulf War. For its pyrophoric properties, i.e. spontaneous burning in air when in fine form (swarfs, metallic dust), uranium in an incendiary warhead could be effective in neutralizing biological or chemical weapons facilities hidden underground or in concrete structures. Powdered uranium could be the incendiary agent in the last stage of a warhead in a penetrating weapon cased or ballasted with uranium. The incendiary warhead would add its mass to the weapon's penetrating impact.
The shaped charge technology also employs uranium. By focusing explosives in one direction e.g. by containing them with a conical or concave hemisphere metal liner, detonation compresses and squeezes the liner forward, forming a jet of molten metal traveling as fast as 10 km/s. Jane's website indicated some time ago that DU was used as "liners in shaped charge warheads". Guided weapons ranging from Maverick and Hellfire missiles to torpedoes, sub-munitions in cluster bombs and the first stage of BROACH MWS warheads use this technology. At his website Williams provides an in-depth, up-to-date review of both the HDBTDC and shaped charge weaponry.
DU is used in counterweights of military aircraft. Civilian aircraft gradually abandon the use of DU weights in favour of safer tungsten, after a number of crashes in which DU weights burned in the fire and contaminated populated areas. Some helicopters have DU weights in the rotor blades, for example, Apache A64 has 100 kg. DU weights would be logical in guided missiles and in other weapons that employ, like aircraft, flight control surfaces. Small quantities of uranium may be in navigational equipment in aircraft, vessels and land vehicles.
During the "Kosovo DU" scandal, U-236, plutonium, americum and other transuranic elements turned out to be in DU, contrary to industry specifications. Although these extremely toxic and radioactive substances were present only in trace quantities, their high power significantly increases the toxicity and radioactivity of the 30 mm DU bullets shot in Operation Allied Force. The substances are spent nuclear fuels and nuclear waste recycled into DU stock. Uranium alloy in weapons has a composition and toxic-radioactive properties depending on what other materials in what quantities have been blended in.
It is, of course, convenient to dispose of very hazardous nuclear waste
far away from the producer's country. Much testing of DU weaponry took place
outside the national territory of the
Use outside a states' territory brings in a whole body of international prohibitions related to "exporting" hazardous materials. As will be set out in Part II, responsible authorities are liable under a wide range of international law beyond humanitarian law.
Fate
of uranium in radiological weapons:
Upon impact, the high kinetic energy of an armour-piercing DU projectile ignites it and helps it penetrate the armour, self-sharpening fashion. Part of DU metal vaporizes into a very fine dust (aerosol) of uranium oxides. About two-thirds are dark brown and black insoluble particles,. Those oxygen-rich are soluble in water, and yellow and orange in colour. The dust covers the target area, is readily re-suspended, and can travel with wind for at least tens of km. Fire consuming DU ammunition and DU armour also turns the metal into oxide particles. Depleted uranium rounds that miss the target may corrode in soil or water, producing fine material that disperses with air movements and washes away. Uranium oxide residue includes unnatural, sharp-edged ceramic particles that pose a special hazard inside the body. About 50 - 70% of the particles in the dust are respirable, i.e. less than 10 mm in size. Soldiers who survive an attack by DU ammunition may have DU metal and dust in the wounds. They will likely have inhaled or ingested far more DU dust than recommended limits on intake. Civilians may also inhale or ingest DU dust or collect fragments of DU metal.
Several US Bradley fighting vehicles were buried in
The Kuwaiti government hired foreign contractors to gather destroyed Iraqi equipment in its territory, including vehicles contaminated with DU [US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 1995]. A 1995 article in the US Army magazine Armor gave advice on minimizing exposure to DU: "If you find radioactive DU contamination on a vehicle, move the vehicle to a site away from water sources, food storage or eating areas, and occupied bivouac sites [...] always keep personnel away from contaminated equipment or terrain unless required to complete the mission."
DU particles still fly around DU battlefields and beyond. With a
half-life of 4.5 billion years, U-238 particles contaminate practically
forever. Elevated radioactivity levels (from U-235 and decay products of U-238
in DU, from transuranics, and U-236 contained in
"dirty" DU, or from other uranium non-nuclear weapons used in the
Gulf War) were measured in
In November 2002, UN Environmental Program (UNEP) investigators of the
fate of DU ammunition used in 1994-1995 in Bosnia recommended evacuation and
cleanups of contaminated buildings and grounds in Had*i*i (Sarajevo) and Han Pijesak (Republika Srpska). Had*i*i refugees in Bratunac and elsewhere have died of radiation exposure, but
a report from a local health professional Dr. Slavica
Jovanovi* has not been published yet. In
Soldiers bring DU particles home on clothing and on "souvenirs"
collected from the battlefields. Many of non-combat military, civilians at the
ports receiving Gulf War soldiers and equipment, as well as families of the
combatants contracted Gulf War syndrome, without ever being near DU
battlefields, and without receiving vaccinations that were administered to the
combatants. In October 2002, vice chairman of the
The combat fate of uranium in the other munitions is similar to that in DU bullets and armour. The energy of impact of uranium penetrators might ignite the metal, or else uranium would burn in the explosion. If uranium remained as fragments, it would eventually corrode. Uranium lining of shaped charges likely turns partially into uranium oxide dust with a high proportion of ceramic particles.
Production, testing, and disposal of uranium weapons create similar
hazards as combat use. To date, most of the states in the
The cleanup bill for DU fine particles, shrapnel and unexploded
ammunition at just one of many such places around the world, the Jefferson
Proving Ground in
Smaller-scale incidents are also hazardous. One
involving pulverization of metallic DU occurred at the Robins Air Force
Base, Georgia. The following note was sent to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
on
Hazards
of uranium
The main hazards of uranium are fire, toxicity, and radioactivity. Uranium in larger chunks ignites at 500 deg C, while in finer form it self-ignites and burns spontaneously in the air. Heavy metal uranium forms oxides that are as toxic as arsenic compounds, particularly affecting the renal system. Inhaling and swallowing a high dose of uranium oxides entering nose and throat could pose a serious risk, as could happen in an acute exposure to explosion dust and debris from a uranium weapon. Prolonged exposure in a contaminated environment would lead to similar effects.
As in the toxic hazard, radioactive risks arise by inhaling uranium dust in the air and ingesting it from dust in the mouth, water, or food. Inhaled particles under 2.5 mm enter deep into the lungs. The body removes insoluble uranium oxides very slowly, halving their amount in 10 to 20 years. Some particles may move from the lung to the lymph nodes and bone. U-238 emits mainly a-particles - high energy but ranging only a few millimeters in the air, and b-particles and g-rays from its products of decay. Hence the radiological insult from a microscopic speck of U-238 oxide inside the body is focused on the surrounding tissue within a radius of about 30 microns.
"Impurities" added to DU in the recycling process add other
"hot " micro-particles to the hazards of pure DU. Uranium radiation
hazards are covered-up and misrepresented. The total radiological dose inside a
person over years severely exceeds safe limits. Limits set by the International
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) derive from empirically invalid
assumptions due to secrecy and distortions around the effects of
Physicists instead of biologists developed the ICRP model before DNA was known, yet it purports to represent cell damage processes. ICRP model spreads a dose over a large mass of tissue instead of considering biophysical and biochemical damage mechanisms at the cellular level. A critique was just published by the European Committee on Radiation Risk (ECRR). It shows ICRP models of risk from internal particles underestimate empirical mortality and morbidity by a factor of 100 to 1000. Long before the ECRR critique, standard textbooks on radioactivity have been stating that if a-particles enter the body with inhalation, food or through open wounds, they become exceptionally dangerous, since they emit much energy to each cell. The standard texts are also clear that long-term effects of accumulated small exposures transfer to future generations. Every dose is harmful and can cause cancer or genetic changes after years, therefore one must always avoid unnecessary exposure and maintain doses in smallest quantities possible.
The hazard of a-particles is large despite their short range in a tissue, for example, 30 microns in the lungs. Although b-particles penetrate tissue to the depth of several centimeters, the resulting biological damage is significantly smaller compared to that of a-particles. The tissue weakens g- and X-rays only to a small degree. The biological effect of one absorbed quantum of g- and X-ray radiation in the tissue is the same as from one quantum of b-radiation.
External exposure by contact with DU metal can be hazardous; over less than a few hours one can get annual allowable dose. DU contaminated by nuclear waste blended into it is more risky. Many military and civilians got sick from wearing "DU jewellery" or keeping DU fragments in the pockets. One mg of U-238 emits per year the equivalent of over one billion high energy, ionizing particles and rays that can produce extensive biological damage. The mass of inhalable particles is typically a few nanograms (one billionth of a gram), so a typical one may emit about a thousand particles per year, or one every few hours. The energy of each a-particle exceeds the damage threshold of vital cell-building molecules. Novel chemical reactions take place, which alter or destroy the shape, organisation and function of these molecules. A particle of uranium oxide lodged in the tissue damages a cell beyond repair [www.llrc.org/health/healthpage.htm]. The radiological insult triggers biological damage mechanisms, which extend the initial damage. ECRR attributes a 1000 more damaging power to a U-238 particle lodged in the tissue, compared to other forms of ingested and inhaled U-238.
Health
effects of uranium exposure
The health effects depend on the quantity of uranium oxide dust inhaled or ingested, frequency, and duration of exposure. A high initial dose can cause acute respiratory failure and poisoning, leading to death within a few days. Smaller doses cause hair loss, reduced regeneration of skin and nails, physical weakness, fatigue, flu-like symptoms, diarrhea, and immune and peripheral nervous system damage manifested up to a few months after the initial exposure. After a year and longer, medium to high doses may cause birth defects in infants of pregnant women, leukemia, and rapid-onset cancers, followed later by slower cancers. Smaller initial doses longer-term may produce multiple physical and mental symptoms, and nervous debilitation.
Damage of immune system in exposed
population could be a major mortality factor in
A team from the Uranium Medical Research Center (UMRC) reported after a
visit to hard-target bomb sites in
The acute symptoms above have been reported by Gulf War veterans,
including post-conflict military personnel exposed to targets contaminated by
DU. The slower onset illness and disorders have been
reported by Gulf veterans, and doctors and health researchers who have worked
with civilians exposed to DU in
As the contaminants spread over the years, so will the health problems. Low but chronic exposure risks may arise from air, water or food contamination in areas surrounding a population. The contaminants could build up and bio-accumulate over years from the initial fallout. Local terrain, ecosystem, meteorological conditions, agricultural practice and food habits are some of the factors that would determine the secondary exposures and doses.
Most DU research to date has assumed healthy, young male soldiers and
low-dose initial exposure from 30 to 120 mm armour-piercers
(mass of DU 0.3 to 4.5 kg per bullet). If uranium is used in warheads having a
mass of up to several tons, then humans surviving the explosion will suffer
acute health effects from much higher doses. Being unprecedented, these
exposures require a new analysis of uranium fate-effect relationships. The
closest analogy would be fires of DU ammunition as at the
Government
and industry documents on uranium hazards
The hazards of DU are similar to those from other uranium metals
suspected in new non-nuclear weapons. Official US and
A 1984 US Federal Aviation Agency document cautions the investigators of aircraft crashes against the hazard from DU in counterweights of civilian airplanes: particles inhaled or ingested are toxic and can cause long-term irradiation of the internal tissue. Six months before the Gulf War, a Science Applications International Corporation report wrote, "Short-term effects of high doses can result in death, while long-term effects of low doses have been implicated in cancer." Shortly after the Gulf War in March 1991, a memo from the US Defence Nuclear Agency stated that alpha particles emitted from DU dust created from exploded DU ammunition pose a health risk, but beta particles from DU shrapnel and from intact DU bullets are a serious hazard to health.
In the early nineties, the UK Atomic Energy Authority warned that if all of the DU fired by tanks in the Gulf War was inhaled,
"there could be half a million deaths as a result by 2000." Tanks
fired only about 8% of all DU used in that war. A 1993
A 1995 US Army Environmental Policy Institute report warned, "Toxicologically, DU poses a health risk when internalized. Radiologically, the radiation emitted by DU results in health risks from both external and internal exposures [...] If DU enters the body, it has the potential to generate significant medical consequences."
A January 2001 leak revealed that the UK Ministry of Defense was secretly testing for radiation poisoning among British soldiers just months before it sent troops to Kosovo. At the time the ministry was refusing screening for Gulf War veterans. The disclosure went much further than an earlier leak that showed only that officers knew 4 years earlier about the risk of developing lung, lymph and brain cancers from DU shells.
The industry is also well aware of the risks from airborne contamination
by DU. Paul Loewenstein, vice president of Nuclear
Metals Inc. (now Starmet Corporation, the prime
The Boeing Corporation safety guide for DU counterweights in aircraft and missiles advises: "Most heavy metals, such as uranium, are toxic to humans depending on the amount introduced into the body. For short-term (acute) exposures, the toxicological effects are the primary concern, and acute exposures to significant amounts of uranium may result in kidney damage. "[Section 4.1.2]. Section 4.1.3 spells out the radiological hazard: "The principal radiological hazard associated with uranium is due to high linear energy transfer of the alpha particles its radionuclides and daughters emit. A chronic exposure to these radionuclides result in an increased risk of cancer, typically in the bones, kidney, and lungs, since these are the organs where uranium is deposited." Section 6.2.5 concerns airborne contamination with uranium fine particles: "Failure to control airborne contamination could result in inhalation of the contamination and spread of contamination to other areas." To this end, Section 12.2.3 commands: "Wear a respirator [.] whenever entering areas with airborne DU dust particles." [Boeing, 2001]
Part 2: Humanitarian law relating to
weaponry
and the
consequences of violations of this law
A weapon may be determined to be illegal two ways:
A weapon made illegal only because there is a specific treaty banning it is only illegal for countries that ratify such a treaty. A weapon that is illegal by operation of existing law is illegal for all countries. This is true even if there is also a treaty on this weapon and a country has not ratified that treaty. Evaluating whether DU weaponry (or any other type of weaponry) is legal or illegal, requires analysis under this law.
Humanitarian law: the basics
The laws and customs of war (humanitarian law) includes all treaties governing military operations, weapons and protection of victims of war as well as all customary international law on these subjects. The main treaties relating to military operations are The Hague Convention of 1899 (186 Parry' s T.S. 429) and The Hague Convention (IV) and Regulations of 1907 (1 Bevans 631), providing a legal framework governing war. Yet some of the most basic rules of war are not found in existing treaties, in part because they were considered widely known and part of the universally understood customary rules of war.
One of these basic rules is the obligation to carry out military
operations only in the field of battle - understood to be operations against
enemy combatants who are not hors de combat and against territory and objects
of the enemy that are deemed legal targets. Article 25 of
Another basic rule requires that all military operations must cease upon cessation of hostilities. Still other customary international rules includes the duty to warn of dangerous materials or weapons and its corollary rule the duty to clean up such material. The duty to warn rule was set out clearly by the International Court of Justice in its famous Corfu Channel case (1949 International court of Justice Reports, 4). The Court in Corfu Channel emphasized the concept of "elementary considerations of humanity" -- echoing the language of the Martens Clause, set out below. As will be seen below, certain provisions of humanitarian law relating to victims of armed conflict also contain limitations on military operations.
The 1899 The Hague Convention banned all weapons and material that cause superfluous injury. Article 23 of the 1907 The Hague Convention, Regulations, specifically recognizes that not all weapons are subject to a "banning" treaty but may be nonetheless banned by operation of existing humanitarian law. The International Court of Justice recognizes this rule in its decision Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996 International Court of Justice Reports). In paragraph 87 of that Decision, the Court found that the principles and rules of humanitarian law apply to all weapons, including nuclear ones. In other parts of the opinion the Court stresses the duty to evaluate legality or illegality prior to use in military operations. Article 23 of the 1907 The Hague Regulations sets out further prohibitions of certain types of weapons and materials to add to those found in existing treaties, especially use of poison or poisoned weapons or weapons or materials causing "unnecessary suffering".
Both the 1899 and 1907 conventions set out what is universally called the Martens Clause (the 8th preambular paragraph in The Hague 1907) which states that in situations not addressed in the Conventions or Regulations, combatants and civilians are protected by "the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience." This rule is repeated in the subsequent treaties relating to victims of armed conflict, and clearly establishes that civil society alone can, by its own initiative, effectively ban a weapon if there is no specific treaty banning it.
Other treaties and instruments prohibiting specific weapons date from the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grammes Weight. The 1899 The Hague conference issued declarations prohibiting projectiles launched from balloons, projectiles diffusing poisons and "dum-dum" bullets. Since that time there have been many treaties relating to specific weapons or types of weapons such as those containing hazardous chemicals, bacteriological material and the like.
A recent addition has been the banning of any type of military action
that would result in undue environmental damage. In addition to a treaty on
this issue, the United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution 47/37 of
Humanitarian law relating to victims of armed conflict is generally
called "
The two protocols strongly set out prohibitions of military operations that would unleash hazardous forces (such as an attack on a nuclear power facility or a dam) or would damage the natural environment or water supply. Consulting all of humanitarian law -- both treaty-based and customary -- four fundamental rules are clearly discernable regarding weapons:
Humanitarian
law violations and UN action on radiation weaponry
Evaluating the effects of radiation (DU) weaponry set out in Part I of this paper, it is clear that this weaponry fail all four tests of humanitarian law:
The issue of the incompatibility of DU weapons with existing international norms has been taken up at both the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights since 1996. While the Commission has not yet issued a resolution on the matter, the Sub-Commission, in its resolution 1996/16 of 29 August 1996, found that use of such weaponry is "incompatible" with existing humanitarian and human rights law. In the same resolution the Sub-Commission began a process to further elaborate on these weapons in light of existing norms by requesting the Secretary-General to look into the issue and report back to the Sub-Commission in 1997. In reply, the Secretary-General issued his report (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/27 and Add.1) containing a number of replies from governments, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations - all supporting the view of the Sub-Commission on the illegality of these weapons.
In its resolution 1997/36 the Sub-Commission continued its investigation of these weapons and appointed one of its members to prepare a paper on the topic. In 2001, following the failure of the first appointed person to submit a paper, the Sub-Commission authorized Justice Y.K.J. Yeung Sik Yuen (Mauritius) to prepare the paper, submitted as UN Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/38. The Sik Yuen paper gives a comprehensive overview of the law and facts of a number of troubling weapons. DU weaponry is addressed separately, but Sik Yuen states that all the weapons addressed in the paper can be classified as weaponry of a nature to cause superfluous injury (WSI) and weaponry causing unnecessary suffering (WUS). (Sik Yuen also discusses fission/fusion nuclear weapons, "mini-nukes" such as the B61-11 "bunker busters", fuel-air bombs ("daisy cutters"), cluster bombs, and chemical and biological weapons, and indicates that the current generation of fuel-air bombs use uranium powder).
The present authors maintain that DU and other radiation weaponry can be proven to be weaponry of mass destruction (WMD) when used in populated areas or in the presence of large numbers of enemy or friendly troops, a position supported by the fact that an unacceptable percentage the US veterans of the Gulf War have some serious health complication that can be attributed to DU weaponry. In any case, uranium (depleted or not) weaponry is "poison" in terms of The Hague Convention and even that definition is sufficient.
Justice Sik Yuen points out a number of issues surrounding the DU controversy that we take up in this paper: the issue of what Sik Yuen refers to as "secrets", the issue of seriously compromised "research" and the issue of the public outcry against DU in light of the Martens Clause. Regarding secrecy he points out two claims made by critics:
Regarding compromised studies, he presents a Rand Corporation report and a report by the Royal Society (UK). The Royal Society was subsequently forced into revising its position on the safety of DU. Regarding the invocation of the Martens Clause, Sik Yuen comments that he was surprised by the number of anti-DU groups and that their actions are an aspect of the Martens Clause.
The 2002 Sub-Commission authorized a second paper by Sik Yuen that is being prepared to submit to the Sub-Commission at its August 2003 session. The fact that the Sub-Commission agrees with the analysis here and has made such a commitment to review of the issue indicates both its understanding that weapons may be banned by operation of existing law, that DU weaponry is that type of weaponry, and that the use of these weapons is very grave.
The Sub-Commission also acknowledges that the issue of weapons in light
of existing human rights and humanitarian law is an appropriate subject for the
UN human rights bodies. It did this because the
Arguments against seeking a DU-banning treaty
Some opponents of DU weaponry have proposed work on an anti-DU treaty. This can be very risky because a new "trick" of the US (and a few other governments) is to use treaty processes to try to weaken, if not completely undermine, existing customary law. The United States tries to assert that if there is a treaty on a subject, then any pre-existing customary international law on the subject is terminated. Thus, even beginning the process to draft a treaty would be used by the US to argue that any ban on uranium weaponry in light of existing customary law is terminated. This would be devastating in the US because Courts in the US are likely to be persuaded on this point even though the International Court of Justice categorically rejects this line of reasoning in the Nicaragua case (Military and Paramilitary Activity In and Against Nicaragua, 1986 International Court of Justice Reports). Note the US also "declined jurisdiction" of the Court in the Nicaragua case although the US is not legally allowed to do so. Neither the US Congress nor its Courts took up this matter.
The
Consequences of uranium weapons use
As uranium weaponry is already illegal under existing humanitarian law, countries that have used them are responsible for military and civilian victims and for environmental pollution throughout the life cycle of the weapons, from development to disposal of unused munitions. The Geneva Conventions require all Parties to "search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed [.] grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts." (Article 49 in the First Geneva Convention. There is an identical provision in the other three conventions of 1949).
Thus uses of DU weaponry place their own military and commanders at serious legal risk. Hopefully, wider understanding of this will constrain the nearly 30 other countries that have or plan to develop, produce and stock radiological munitions. The US has exported known and suspected uranium weapons to over 20 countries. It does this in part to militate against the "customary" prohibition of these weapons, presumably to be able to argue that if a large number of countries have DU and other radiological weaponry in their arsenals, it weighs against a ban by operation of customary humanitarian law. However, it is likely that many of the countries having DU weaponry supplied by the US in their arsenals did not know what it was. And it appears that most of these countries have not used these weapons in military operations. And further, these countries in aggregate cannot re-write The Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and all other instruments or customary rules of humanitarian law. To do so would require large-scale denunciation of the treaties - which no country is prepared to do.
Further, governments that manufacture or have purchased uranium weapons
are likely to be compromised into maintaining
The UN human rights forum's prolific studies of this issue began with the "van Boven" study: van Boven's final paper on the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8) culminates work that began in 1989. The Commission on Human Rights carried on with the appointment of Cherif Bassiouni as first an independent expert and then a Special Rapporteur. The van Boven "Guidelines" for remedies, derived from long-existing treaty-based and customary laws were included, with modifications, in Bassiouni's final report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62, Annex.
A minimum requirement of the duty to remedy from use of illegal weaponry is compensation for all victims. This can include, for example, military and civilian victims from uranium wars and civilian victims of uranium weapon use at military ranges. Part of the minimum remedy is the duty to fully disclose all facts about the weapons and their development and deployment. Regarding environmental damages, users of these weapons are obligated to carry out an effective clean-up. When lands and water resources cannot be effectively cleaned up, the State causing the damage must pay damages equal to the loss of those lands and waters from the national patrimony. In US dollars, the cost of legal claims and environmental cleanup for the Gulf War alone would be staggering.
The chief prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Carla del Ponte, initially refused to prosecute NATO for contaminating Bosnia and Kosovo with uranium due to use of DU weaponry in the Balkans. But on January 14, 2001, she said her tribunal would act "if coherent results emerge directly linking the use of DU ammunition with health problems." This statement of a theoretical willingness to open the tribunal to prosecution and potential damage claims is a key factor in the continued "artificial" controversy about what DU and other radiation weapons actually do. As more and more evidence surfaces that the developers of the weaponry knew how lethal it was, even before the Gulf War, it will become more and more difficult for the Tribunal to keep this issue out.
Compensation and clean-up costs in Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would also be staggering, more so if hard-target weapons, cluster bombs and other weaponry made with uranium were deployed in substantial numbers. Taking on the issue of consequences of the use of DU weaponry and fashioning adequate remedies for the victims of these weapons would go a long way to dispelling increased international consternation over the appearance of bias in the operation of the tribunal - with to date not one warrant for a member of the NATO forces and relatively few for non-Serbian participants.
In addition to the elaboration of remedies under humanitarian law and for gross violations of human rights, there has been a necessary evolution in the concept of international environmental law, especially arising from the Sub-Commission's incorporation of a right to a healthy environment as part of its mandate. The seminal work was done by the Sub-Commission's Special Rapporteur Fatma-Zohra Ksentini (now Fatma-Zohra Ouhachi-Vesely), culminating in final report UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9. Ouhachi-Vesely was subsequently appointed as Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights to address the issue of toxics and toxic dumping - a mandate that continues today. Her work involves investigating allegations of damage due to toxic materials (such as DU) and trying to work out appropriate remedies. This mandate may prove a fruitful vehicle to heighten international concern over uranium weapons and to elaborate the legal consequences and obligations of users.
Part 3: Anatomy of cover-ups
Group-think
The US and UK governments claim they deploy DU ammunition because for a lower cost compared to tungsten, it can have an advantage over enemy armour, reduce their own casualties and utilize industrial waste. The claims are not justified. The additional expense on tungsten would be negligible in the total military spending. The DU weapons are not effective compared to alternatives [Venik's Aviation, 2001]. DU ammunition and armour do not utilize significant quantities of the total nuclear waste.
As to protecting own soldiers, the victims of "friendly fire" suffer from acute poisoning and radiation sickness, instead of ordinary wounds, while longer-term casualties are substantial. A US study of 10,000 Gulf War Veterans indicated that 80% could have been exposed to DU, i.e. more than half a million. Of the tens of thousands of coalition soldiers serving after the war's end, only about 30 specialists knew how to identify equipment contaminated by DU and were aware of the need to wear protective clothing.
September 2002 Gulf War report on US veterans shows 0.1% casualty rate in combat, but a 36% post-combat rate. Uranium is one of several major causes of the syndrome, so a casualty rate of several percent would be attributable to DU. Official reports in the West ignore civilian casualties of uranium weapons in Iraq, the Balkans, and recently in Afghanistan. Iraqis and Serbs were subject to economic sanctions when they most needed medical supplies, fuel and food. Sick Afghanis with weakened immune resistance due to uranium contamination died of cold and starvation, without being recorded as victims of uranium weapons.
Given that the
Pro-uranium propaganda has seriously compromised scientific reports, even by international organizations, all subject to military-government funding and control. It was also verbalized in statements from government, military and arms and nuclear industry. It is of great concern that political representatives were unable to obtain information from alternative sources. That the propaganda was accepted by decision makers despite unverifiable contents points to a fundamental flaw in how these countries address military issues and weapons.
Countless journalists, researchers, professors and persons in responsible positions help in NATO deception and misinformation. Those individuals break professional ethics of primary allegiance to public good, and have willingly or unwillingly, knowingly or unknowingly, colluded in the crimes by spreading lies and distortions about fatal effects of uranium. The propaganda has led to an absurd situation where national leaders and parliaments justify attacking Iraq because it might have potential in the future to deploy WMD - but plan themselves to use equally lethal uranium weapons of indiscriminate or mass effect against Iraq.
Uranium weapons likely persist due to institutional pressures that, once started to defend an effective DU bullet, escalated to a point of no return. Switching to other types of weapons would indirectly admit the hazards, while ample evidence incriminates those responsible because they knew the potential dangers from the beginning. In an extreme case scenario, war-mongers and ethnic-haters in high positions may have discovered an effective toxic-radioactive terrorist tool in uranium weapons. With it, they can damage present and future generations of the "enemy" without public stigma of WMD, though with some 'collateral damage" to own civilians and troops over the lifecycle of the weapons.
Williams [2002] considered that civilian and military decision makers responsible for propagation and use of uranium weapons may be caught up in a "group think" - a self-justifying logic that generates illusory morality, demands conformity, accepts high risk strategies and demonizes enemies and dissenters. The phenomenon led to the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Some Western governments seem to be following the group-think in the US wars with "Saddam", "Milosevic" and recently the "Wars on Terrorism". Group-think in authoritarian organizations would explain why the health risks of uranium weapons have been downplayed or outright ignored by the military, and why those responsible chose to cover up their criminal position, rather than relinquish uranium weapons.
Indirect evidence exists that cover-up was desired. In 1947 a secret memo from the US Atomic Energy Commission had this self-incriminating statement about medical experiments on human subjects: "It is desired that no document be released which refers to experiments with humans and might have adverse affects on public opinion or result in legal suits. Documents covering such work field should be classified 'secret.'"
Following the Gulf War's "full scale low-radiation experiment with DU bullets, a memo dated March 1, 1991, from Lt. Col. Ziehmn of Los Alamos National Laboratory apparently defined future US military policy regarding DU weapons: "It is believed that du penetrators were very effective against Iraqi armor; however, assessments of such will have to be made. There has been and continues to be a concern regarding the impact of du on the environment. Therefore, if no one makes a case for the effectiveness of du on the battlefield, du rounds may become politically unacceptable and thus, be deleted from the arsenal. If du penetrators proved their worth during our recent combat activities, then we should assure their future existence (until something better is developed) through Service/DoD proponency. If proponency is not garnered, it is possible that we stand to lose a valuable combat capability. I believe we should keep this sensitive issue at mind when after action reports are written."
A few years later, as hard-target weapons came on the development, testing and combat use stream, the philosophy must have been extended to the newer military applications of uranium waste. Logically, similar cover-up approach would govern next weapons that leave low-level radiation behind, for many future generations to deal with.
Information
warfare
Information warfare is one of the instruments of power, beside combat,
diplomacy, and economic sanctions. PsyOp
(Psychological Operations) are among its most conspicuous tools. Information
warfare is effective and inexpensive compared to combat, and would fit the
needs of "Service/DoD proponency"
named in Ziehmn's memo above. The military specifies
the structure and methods of Information Operations that engage behavioural science, mass media and high technology [Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 1987; Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1996].
According to NATO [Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996], their PsyOp target "enemy, friendly and neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behavior affecting the achievement of political and military objectives." NATO countries' military and media act like clones of Pentagon. Critique comes mainly from outside the Pact. It seems that the only audiences that yielded to Pentagon and NATO DU propaganda were allies in the North Atlantic Pact.
Information Warfare integrates several types of special services when needed. A joint command of US Special Operations is then engaged to assemble teams of experts in different fields and services to suit a mission. Attacks on anti-DU activist, Dr. Doug Rokke, former Pentagon expert on DU, were likely steered by US Special Operations in a broader campaign of "fighting" the truth about DU.
The military and government authorities forged death certificates of Balkan DU military victims. In March 2001, "unknown criminals" broke into the home of Mrs. Riordan, the widow of a Canadian veteran of the Gulf War, destroyed her computer and stole medical certificates of uranium presence in the body of her husband. Police refused to investigate, because the criminals "did not leave any traces."
With the emergence of uranium weapon issues into the public arena, the propaganda applies simple, often ridiculous, ideas and phrases that nevertheless have public appeal. The process exploits two rules: (i) a repeated lie becomes accepted truth; (ii) the public accepts outrageous lies more readily.
Propaganda plays with words bred in PsyOp
bureaus. The words, phrases and contexts are then uttered by authoritative
persons, proving the speakers and their controllers are either criminally negligent
or are consciously contravening humanitarian and war laws. Former NATO
political chief Javier Solana perhaps broke a record of DU nonsense. While
heading an ad hoc "investigation" to prove Kosovo DU was no danger,
he stated, "The evidence points in the other direction." "Is DU
a health benefit?", wondered a reader in a
Lord Robertson, supposedly an educated man, defended the "proven [DU] technology that has been independently tested [.] We cannot possibly act on the perceptions of people or on the view of a word such as 'uranium'." Bein and Zori* [2001] assembled other statements, deceptive nomenclature and phrases concerning DU and uranium.
Some countries exploited NATO DU propaganda for their own agendas. For
example,
ACLS became a research contractor in all DU studies in the Balkans. In another cynical move the Swiss government offered money to Albanian *migr*s if they would return to Kosovo.
David
and Goliath
The scale, tools employed and pervasiveness of information warfare regarding radiation weaponry indicate substantial resources invested. Doubtless, the funds come from tax revenues. Debunking the propaganda feels like a struggle with a Goliath, yet great strides have been achieved with relatively infinitesimal resources, as can be gauged by the growing multitude of anti-DU groups, the quality of their publications, and steadily rising public sensitivity to the issue.
Dissemination and campaigning is usually done by volunteers, many of whom have been marginalized, if not intimidated, as being a threat to the establishment. Predictably (but not for the perpetrators), intimidation had the opposite effect, and further eroded the trust of the public, particularly the sick veterans, spilling over onto recruits and staff soldiers .being prepared for next wars.
Upon seeing how NATO disrespected their health in Kosovo, many KFOR
troops mutinied, while volunteers stepped back. Several countries withdrew from
their NATO obligation in Kosovo because of contamination. Post-war aid
organizations are reluctant to go to
With the arrival of dates for statutory disclosures of secrets from the
atomic era, coincidental with surfacing of predictably ever more numerous
victims of recent "safe" radiation weapons, the public suspicion,
mistrust and mutiny would grow, creating an additional major stressor in
already unstable Western societies. Abroad, the rising public conscience about
the aftermath of uranium weapons would contribute to general animosity and
terrorism against the West, particularly the
Two scenarios are plausible from now on: either the perpetrators step up
intimidation of the discoverers of the truth (which proved futile so far), or
they start backing away from their criminal activity. Because the US and
Despite large resources expended, PsyOp are easily identified by amateurs. In 1999, Bein predicted in a Polish article [www.eco.pl/zb/147/] the following techniques for cover-up of Balkan DU, based on post-Gulf War experience: . Deny information and delay its release; understate the quantity of DU weapons used. . Belittle harmful effects of DU, change emphasis and dilute scientific information. . Manipulate reports and scientific evidence, including those from previous DU wars. . Censor DU information in mass media. . Blame other causes, such as pre-war or general pollution. . Coerce old and new Yugoslav government to withhold the truth. . Blame "Milosevic's" secret weapons, and DU deployed by Yugoslav forces.